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PARTIES 
The parties to this litigation are: 
Appellant: Kathy Lynn Higgins, individually and as guardian 
ad litem for her daughter Shaundra Higgins; 
Appellees: Salt Lake County, by and through Salt Lake County 
Mental Health, Dr. William Kuentzel and Sheryl 
Steadman; 
The University of Utah and the University Medical 
Center; 
Other 
Defendants: This action was originally commenced against the 
Appellees, Caroline Trujillo and the State of 
Utah/ by and through the Department of Corrections 
and by and through the Department of Social 
Services. This is an appeal from summary judgment 
entered pursuant to Rules 54(b) and 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Proceduref in favor of the 
Appellees. Caroline Trujillo remains as a party 
in the trial court. Appellant settled with the 
State of Utah and the case against it was dis-
missed. 
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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Supreme Court under 
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah and Rules 
4(a), 54(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
!• Did the lower court err in granting summary judgment 
where there were issues of controverted material fact? 
2. Did the lower court err in granting summary judgment 
that County Mental Health and the Medical Center owed no duty to 
Kathy Higgins and her daughter, who was stabbed by Appellees' 
mentally ill and dangerous patient with whom they had a special 
relationship/ when County Mental Health and the Medical Center had 
the right or ability to control their patient and negligently 
breached the recognized standards in the community in failing to 
do so? 
3. Did the lower court err in granting summary judgment that 
County Mental Health and the Medical Center owed no duty to Kathy 
Higgins and her daughter, who was stabbed by a mentally ill and 
dangerous patient of County Mental Health and the Medical Center, 
when their breach of recognized standards of care in the community 
in evaluating and treating the patient caused the stabbing? 
4. Did the lower court err in granting summary judgment that 
County Mental Health owed no duty to Kathy Higgins and her 
daughter, who was stabbed by a mentally ill patient placed into 
the care and custody of County Mental Health as a condition of a 
probation order, where the stabbing resulted from County Mental 
Health's failing to evaluate and treat the patient as required by 
the court order and from County Mental Health improperly causing 
probation to terminate by making false and inadequate disclosures 
to probation authorities? 
5. Did the lower court summary judgments violate the Open 
Courts Provision, and the due process and equal protection 
guarantees of the Utah and United States Constitutions? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The determinative provisions are the Open Courts, due process 
and equal protection guarantees of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a civil action against Salt Lake County, by and 
through Salt Lake County Mental Health and its employees Dr. 
William Kuentzel and Sheryl Steadman (hereinafter "County Mental 
Health"), and the University of Utah and the University Medical 
Center (hereinafter "Medical Center") for permanent and severe 
physical and psychological injuries suffered by Shaundra and Kathy 
Higgins when Caroline Trujillo (hereinafter Trujillo), a dangerous 
and mentally ill patient of the Appelleesf stabbed Shaundra on 
April 10, 1984.-7 
Appellant's claims against County Mental Health and the 
Medical Center are based upon their breach of a duty to meet 
minimum standards recognized in this community in evaluating, 
-Appellant's claims were brought in two seperate law-
suits which were consolidated into the present case. [R. at 751-
7521. 
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treating and controlling their dangerous patient, Trujillo, 
including the minimum standards recognized in this community to 
take reasonable and medically accepted precautions to control a 
violent patient that is seeking in-patient hospitalization for her 
mental illness. 
The Appellant carefully pled her claims of negligence in the 
lower court. [R. at 955-973; 1030-1042]. The Complaints speci-
fically allege that County Mental Health and the Medical Center 
breached duties owed by psychotherapist/mental health care 
providers that have consistently been recognized by the Courts to 
run to assaulted victims of mentally ill and dangerous patients, 
including: (1) the duty arising from the "special relationship11 
between the patient and her psychotherapist/mental health care 
providers; (2) the duty of the psychotherapist/mental health care 
provider to properly treat the patient and to use reasonable care 
to take necessary precautions to protect the patient's victims; 
and, (3) the duty imposed upon and accepted by psychotherapist/ 
mental health care providers under court orders to care for and 
treat a mentally ill probationer and to accurately and properly 
advise probation authorities about the probationer/patient's 
2/ failure to meet court-ordered conditions.-
The Appellees moved for summary judgment asserting no duty 
-The Amended Complaints also claim damages for the emotional 
distress suffered by Shaundra's mother, Kathy Higgins, from the 
stabbing. The arguments in this brief as to "duty11 owed Shaundra 
apply to the emotional distress claim and Appellant asserts, 
without repeating the arguments, that Appellees owed her this duty 
as well. 
- 3 -
was owed to Appellant and her daughter. To support their motions, 
the Appellees submitted lengthy statements of fact to minimize 
their relationship with Trujillo and their involvement with her. 
[R. at 1144-1252; 1849-1869]. 
Appellant disputed most of Appellees1 lengthy and unsupported 
facts with precise citations to the record [R. at 1609-1634, 
1931-1983] and submitted detailed affidavits from respected local 
mental health experts and from members of Trujillo's family to 
show that, together with the deposition testimony, this stabbing 
could have been avoided had the Appellees met appropriate and 
recognized standards of care in evaluating, treating or con-
trolling their dangerous and mentally ill patient. [R. at 1701-
1715; 1761-1767; 2123-2126]. Copies of the Affidavits are 
attached as Exhibits 1 for the experts and 2 for Trujillo's 
family. 
The lower court granted summary judgment on the basis that no 
duty was owed to Appellant and her daughter. [R. at 2346-2351]. 
Copies of the Judgments are attached as Exhibits 3 and 4. Appel-
lant timely filed her Notice of Appeal, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit 5. [R. at 2360]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Every case thoughtfully examining the duties owed by psycho-
therapist/mental health care providers to third parties arises 
within the context of a trial of the facts of the particular 
- 4 -
case.- Recent cases from the Utah Supreme Court examining the 
duty to control the conduct of a third person also carefully 
review the facts to determine if a duty exists.- The following 
recitation of facts, and the reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn in Appellant's favor, are based on this principle. These 
facts demonstrate the close and special relationship of County 
Mental Health and the Medical Center and Trujillo, her long and 
well-known history of violence and the negligent evaluation, 
treatment and control of Trujillo resulting in the stabbing of 
Shaundra. 
A. THE STABBING OF SHAUNDRA HIGGINS. 
Trujillo, a known dangerous, mentally ill schizophrenic with 
an organic brain disorder, began to display obvious signs of 
increased psychotic disorder in the late winter and spring of 
1984. [R. at 1761-1767; Aff'd. of Dr. Louis A. Moench]. 
Although a long-term patient of County Mental Health with a 
history of voluntary and court-ordered hospitalizations at the 
Medical Center, Trujillo was negligently denied proper care and 
treatment during this time from County Mental Health and the 
Medical Center. For instance, she was not voluntarily nor 
-See e.g., Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989); 
Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988). 
-
7See Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1188-90 (Utah 1989) 
(examining facts necessary to establish special relationship); 
Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989) (examining history of 
assailant's violence in considering duty). 
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involuntarily hospitalized when the standard of care mandated it for 
her intensified psychotic and dangerous condition. [R. at 1761-
1767, 2123-2126, 2127; Aff'ds. of Drs. Moench and Attiya]. 
On the afternoon of April 10, 1984, as Trujillo, then age 26, 
sat alone in her bedroom, she thought about an imagined incident 
between Shaundra Higgins and Trujillo1s daughter that Trujillo had 
brooded over for six months. Trujillo became quite agitated and 
responded to an inner voice telling her to get a knife and stab 
Shaundra. [R. at 2067, 2068]. Psychotic symptoms like these had 
caused Trujillo to act violently and stab other people in the past 
and had led, among other things, to three involuntary commitments 
by court order to County Mental Health and four involuntary commit-
ments by court order to the Medical Center. [R. at 1678, 1682, 
1688, 21791. 
Trujillo followed these voices and began walking toward the 
Higgins home. She stepped into an alley next to the home and 
found Shaundra returning from an errand to a local 7-11 conven-
ience store. Trujillo stabbed Shaundra with a knife at least 
three times, piercing Shaundra's chest, severing her aorta and 
puncturing her abdomen. [R. at 621-629, 2031-2037]. An ambulance 
was summoned which rushed Shaundra to Primary Children's Hospital 
where complex and delicate surgery was performed. 
Shaundra is now afflicted with extensive and permanent scars 
from the surgery, including one that runs the entire length of 
Shaundra's chest and abdomen, together with two other scars from 
the stabbing that indicate the precise locations where Trujillo 
- 6 -
stuck the knife. [Depo. of Kathy Higgins, p. 48-50, 72-90; R. at 
2372]. 
The stabbing also strongly impacted Shaundra's and Kathyls 
emotional and psychological well-being. Shaundra now has a sub-
stantial psychiatric disorder which impairs her interpersonal 
relationships, education and employment prospects and which will 
require intensive psychiatric therapy and possible hospitaliza-
tion. The disorder is manifested by nightmares, the fear of being 
alone and a decline in school performance and grades. In addi-
tion, Shaundra's mother, Kathy Higgins, suffers from emotional 
distress that has also caused nightmares, fear of others and fear 
for her now afflicted daughter. [Depo. of Kathy Higgins, p. 
48-50, 72-90; R. at 2372]. 
B. TRUJILLO'S HISTORY OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND 
VIOLENCE AND HER SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH AND THE MEDICAL CENTER. 
Trujillo's stabbing of Shaundra Higgins followed a decade of 
extensive, well-documented psychological problems and violent, 
assaultive criminal behavior which included a similar violent 
5/ 
stabbing.-
1. Trujillo's Mental Illness and Her Treatment From County 
Mental Health and the Medical Center. 
Trujillo, before and at the time she stabbed Shaundra, had 
been diagnosed as having a major mental illness, schizophrenia, 
- A lengthy chronology of Trujillo's history of psychiatric 
problems is attached to Appellant's Opposition to the Medical 
Center's Motion for Summary Judgment [R. at 2128-2234]. 
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paranoid type, as well as organic brain dysfunction, and marginal 
intelligence. Her behavior fit into a category of an anti-social 
personality disorder, which distinguished her from most schizo-
phrenics and set her apart as someone needing extra attention and 
precautions. [Aff'd. of Dr. Louis A. Moench; R. at 1761 - 17671. 
The first official indications of Trujillo's illness and 
anti-social behavior are documented in criminal records indicating 
five arrests for being "ungovernable" as a young teenager [R. at 
2023] and hospital records indicating Trujillo, at age fifteen, 
was violent and belligerent and a user of amphetamines, barbit-
uates, hallucinogenics, heroine, cocaine and "anything that she 
can get her hands on." [R. at 2142]. 
Trujillo was placed by Court order in a detention center to 
control this destructive behavior and then was involuntarily and 
"temporarily" committed by Court Order for hospitalization to the 
Medical Center after she made delusionary claims that her parents 
were trying to kill her. [R. at 650, 663, 1679 and 1680]. 
As early as 1976, the Medical Center itself diagnosed 
Trujillo as a paranoid schizophrenic with poor judgment and no 
insight into her illness. [R. at 660]. Three physicians, in-
cluding ones from the Medical Center, testified at a mental health 
hearing that resulted in Trujillo's temporary commitment becoming 
an indeterminent order of hospitalization, there being no appropri-
ate, less restrictive alternative. [R. at 1679]. 
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Thereafter, as an involuntarily committed patientf Trujillo 
was transferred to the care of County Mental Health where her 
course of treatment consisted of failed appointments for therapy 
and where she demonstrated vague, global and anxious tendencies, 
with forced and irregular speech and loose and tangential 
thoughts. County Mental Health psychiatrists also diagnosed her 
as a schizophrenic at this early age. [R. at 633-6341. 
Trujillo was again involuntarily hospitalized at the Medical 
Center in 1978 after she had abandoned a ten-day-old child at Holy 
Cross Hospital because she was delusional. She was treated with 
in-patient therapy and then discharged to be followed by County 
Mental Health where she was almost immediately arrested for 
assault and felony theft. [R. at 634, 667, 668, 2033, 2153]. 
The Courts sent Trujillo to the Utah State Hospital to deter-
mine if she was competent to stand trial. [R. at 670]. Trujillo 
was threatening and violent at the hospital and State Hospital 
psychiatrists diagnosed her as having borderline to below normal 
intelligence, with probable organic brain syndrome and some 
psychotic features, including schizophrenia and a personality 
disorder with anti-social and hysterical features. [R. at 571-
576]. 
Trujillo was eventually determined to be "competent" and was 
released from the State Hospital. [R. at 577] Five months after 
her release, she was again committed by Court Order to the Medical 
Center for a fourth time because she had been arrested, was 
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threatening social workers, having trouble with police arrests and 
altercations and evidencing increased paranoia. [R. at 579]. The 
order of hospitalization on this occasion again found that 
Trujillo was mentally ill and needed custodial caref there being 
no less restrictive alternative. [R. at 16821. The Medical 
Center on this occasion evaluated Trujillo as follows: 
This is the fourth psychiatric admission for 
this patient diagnosed as paranoid schizo-
phrenia. There have been previous problems of 
disposition as well as previous involuntary 
commitments. It should be noted that she has 
had trouble in the past following medication 
instructions, caring for herself, and 
children. 
[R. at 21791. 
Trujillo was again discharged from the hospital with follow-
up care to be provided by County Mental Health. In 1981, Trujillo 
was admitted to the Utah State Hospital for a second time to 
determine if she was competent to stand trial for stabbing a 
senior citizen. [R. at 2195]. The medical records on this 
occasion describe Trujillo as talking to herself and then stabbing 
the senior citizen while yelling, "Die, bitch." [R. at 2202]. 
The records further show Trujillo's family pleading for help and 
warning that Trujillo had to be arrested to be hospitalized. [R. 
at 2203]. 
While hospitalized for this earlier stabbing, Trujillo was 
diagnosed as having "subnormal intelligence crowded by the appear-
ance of a mild organic brain syndrome and a personality style with 
anti-social features." [R. at 2201]. She attacked patients and 
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had to be secluded. [R. at 21971. After her medications were 
increased to therapeutic levels/ she was found competent and not 
overtly psychotic and returned to the criminal court to stand 
trial. [R. at 2197] . 
Trujillo pled guilty to this stabbing and to other charges 
pending against her for striking pedestrians. [R. at 1688-1690]. 
She was placed on probation with the condition she receive mental 
health care from County Mental Health. [R. at 1688 -1690]. As a 
condition of this probation, Trujillo was required to receive 
treatment three times a week [R. at 1725] and see her primary 
therapist once a week at County Mental Health. As set forth in 
detail below, Trujillo utterly failed to meet these conditions [R. 
at 1727-1730] and her probation was improperly terminated because 
of representations made by County Mental Health that Trujillo had 
complied with the conditions of probation. [R. at 1737]. 
After the probation terminated, Trujillo began to display 
obvious signs that her condition was worsening. She suffered 
persistent auditory hallucinations, confusion and thought dis-
tubances. She engaged in self-harmful acts, including attempted 
suicide, and erratically used medications prescribed for her. [R. 
at 1761-1767]. As shown below, she sought, but was denied, the 
care and treatment from County Mental Health and the Medical 
Center that was necessary to control her and avoid the stabbing of 
Shaundra. [R. at 1761-1767, 2123-2126]. 
A number of mental health experts evaluated Trujillo after 
the stabbing. Virtually every one of them indicated the stabbing 
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could be attributed to Trujillo's mental illness and propensity 
for violence. Trujillo was seen as (1) mentally ill, dangerous 
and in need of care and treatment in an in-patient hospital before 
the stabbing [Aff'd. of Dr. Manya Attiya, R. at 1673-1676]; (2) 
having a very constricted mental status which was compatible with 
mild to moderate mental retardation, exhibiting signs of paranoid 
schizophrenia, that made Trujillo an ongoing threat to others and 
likely to repeat her assaultive behavior [Report of Dr. Allen 
Jeppson; R. at 629-6321; and, (3) having an organic brain impair-
ment with a schizophrenic personality disorder that made Trujillo 
a danger to others with little ability to appreciate the extent 
and consequences of her actions. [Depo. of Dr. Robert Howell, p. 
38 and Exhibit 4 to Depo; R. at 2369]. 
Dr. Louis A. Moench, a licensed general and forensic 
psychiatrist, reviewed the medical records and the depositions of 
Appellees1 key employees in this case. [R. at 1761-1767]. His 
full affidavit is set forth as Exhibit 1. Dr. Moench unequivo-
cally concluded that Trujillo presented an unacceptable high level 
of risk prior to the stabbing because of her mental illness and 
substantial history of violence that set her apart from other 
schizophrenics. He further noted that Appellees acted negligently 
in assessing Trujillo's treatment and in failing to hospitalize 
her. [R. at 1761-1767]. Indeed, his testimony, together with 
that of Dr. Manya Attiya, indicates that had the proper evaluation 
and treatment been provided, including hospialization, Trujillo's 
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psychosis and the risk of violence could have been better con-
trolled and it would have been unlikely that this stabbing would 
have occurred. [R. at 1761-1767, 1673-16771. 
2. The Criminal and Violent History of Trujillo Which 
County Mental Health and the Medical Center Knew or 
Should Have Known. 
Trujillo had a long history of violence and crime that 
Appellees knew or could have easily learned from examining 
Trujillo's medical records. That history is set out in full 
detail as Exhibit 19 to Appellant's Opposition to the Medical 
Center's Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. at 2241-2282]. 
The record in this case shows Trujillo had committed several 
violent and assaultive acts between the ages of twelve and twenty-
three, from 1972 through 1981. For instance, Trujillo had 
attempted suicide [R. at 2239], had been declared ungovernable 
five times [R. at 2239] , had been diagnosed as a danger to herself 
and others [R. at 2243], had been repeatedly arrested for loiter-
ing and loitering for the purposes of prostitution [R. at 2240] , 
had been arrested for trespassing [R. at 2240] and had been 
arrested for assault and battery and for theft. [R. at 2240]. 
In addition, Trujillo had been committed by Court order to 
the Medical Center on four separate occasions [R. at 2180], had 
been committed to the care of County Mental Health on at least two 
occasions [R. at 1680, 1688] and had twice been committed to the 
care of the Utah State Hospital [R. at 2199]. Many of these 
commitments were characterized by assaults and threats on jailers 
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[R. at 2263], hospital staff [R. at 2278 and 2269], social workers 
and other patients [R. at 2252, 2257 and 2273]. On many 
occasions, Trujillo was placed in closed wards, in seclusion and 
in restraints to control her violence. [R. at 2252 and 2272]. 
In July, 1981, at the age of twenty-three, Trujillo was 
arrested in Ogden for assaulting pedestrians. The Ogden City 
Police indicated on this occasion that "a crazy lady" using 
obscene gestures and abusive language struck several pedestrians, 
including a woman and her small child. [R. at 581]. Trujillo 
pled guilty to the reduced charge of disorderly conduct, [R. at 
713] and sentencing was continued until August 1981, pending the 
completion of a presentence report, during which time Trujillo was 
placed non her own recognizance." [R. at 713, 714]. 
Trujillo failed to appear for sentencing and was arrested in 
September 1981, in Salt Lake City for the unprovoked stabbing of a 
senior citizen. As briefly set forth in the following chart, the 
facts of that stabbing are remarkably similar to Shaundra's 
stabbing: 
1981 Stabbing of 1984 Stabbing of 
Senior Citizen Shaundra 
Address: 505 East 900 South 932 Princeton (1052 S.) 
Address of Victim: 846 South Park St. 932 Princeton 
Injury Inflicted: Stab wound Stab wound to heart and 
abdomen 
Weapon: Pocket knife Small knife 
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Description of 
stabbing: Victim had just Shaundra was coming 
left 7-11 when home from 7-11 when 
Trujillo ran toward Trujillo ran toward 
her with concealed her with a concealed 
knife and stabbed knife, 
her. 
[R. at 2202-2203]. 
Trujillo pled "no contest" to assault charges for the 1981 
stabbing and was sentenced to one year probation on the condition 
she be treated by County Mental Health in a group home. Trujillo 
was also placed in the care of County Mental Health for the 
reduced disorderly conduct charge she pled to in Ogden. [R. at 
1688]. As conditions of her sentences, Trujillo was required to 
continue to take medications/ to receive mental health treatments 
three days a week and to visit Sheryl Steadman, her "primary 
therapist," at County Mental Health. [R. at 1725]. Importantly, 
County Mental Health was consulted about and agreed to these 
conditions. [Steadman Depo. at 91; R. at 1725]. 
Trujillo stayed in the group home a short while and utterly 
failed to meet any of the other court-ordered conditions of her 
probation. She rarely attended the daily sessions and she failed 
to attend weekly visits to Appellee Steadman. [R. at 1727-1730]. 
Eventually, she grew increasingly psychotic. [R. at 1731]. Even 
so, County Mental Health erroneously advised probation authorities 
at the end of one year that Trujillo was "taking her medications 
and attending her treatment sessions." [R. at 1733]. The 
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authorities were also advised that County Mental Health would 
"continue to monitor her medication" and "urge her to attend 
therapy." [R. at 1744]. Based upon these erroneous representa-
tions , probation officials recommended and in 1983 the Court 
ordered termination of Trujillo's probation. [R. at 1744]. 
Subsequent to the erroneous termination of her probation, 
Trujillo began to be more tangential and to decompensate. [R. at 
2232]. She specifically sought to be hospitalized by County 
Mental Health and the Medical Center, both of which negligently 
failed to hospitalize, treat and control her. 
C. COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH'S AND THE MEDICAL CENTER'S 
TREATMENT AND CONTROL OF TRUJILLO IMMEDIATELY 
BEFORE AND AT THE TIME OF THE STABBING. 
In the three months prior to Shaundra Higgins1 stabbing, 
Trujillo and her family desperately sought treatment and care from 
County Mental Health and the Medical Center to control Trujillo's 
psychosis and violence. [Aff'd. of Rebecca Navarro; R. at 1701; 
Aff'd. of Richard Navarro; R. at 1708; Aff'd. of Dorothy 
Candelaria; R. at 1713]. 
Indeed, Trujillo, in "crisis" and on her own initiative, 
sought care and treatment in January of 1984, when, without an 
appointment, she went to County Mental Health to obtain medica-
tions. County Mental Health, although noting Trujillo to be 
"demanding to see her primary therapist," agitated," "unreason-
able" and "angry," refused to prescribe the medications. [Crosby 
Depo. at 40; R. at 2234, 2377]. 
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Trujillo went to see her primary therapist, Sheryl Steadman 
one week later for a "regular appointment," which appointments she 
had repeatedly failed to attend in the past. At the time, 
Trujillo had head and neck tremors. Steadman did not change her 
usual "approach" to Trujillo and prescribed a dosage of medication 
that was inadequate, even though Trujillo was so "loose and 
tangential" as to make Steadman unsure whether Trujillo could 
comprehend what Steadman was telling her about her medications. 
[R. at 2234; Steadman Depo. at 125-128; R. at 23711. 
Shortly thereafter, on February 17, 1984, Trujillo again went 
to see Sheryl Steadman who found her "funny today" and only 
capable of answering "yes" or "no" to open-ended questions. [R. 
at 2235]. Again, Steadman merely prescribed the medications 
Trujillo had been receiving. Importantly, Steadman did not con-
sult with Dr. William Kuentzel, the County Mental Health psychia-
trist "responsible" for Trujillo [Steadman Depo. at 116; R. at 
2371], and her failure to do so fell far below the standard of 
care. [Aff'd. of Dr. Moench, R. at 1764-1766]. 
In addition, Dr. Kuentzel did not see Trujillo at all in 
1984. Medications continued to be prescribed by nurses, which 
medications were insufficient to control Trujillo"s psychotic 
symptoms and propensity for violence, [Aff'd. of Dr. Moench, R. at 
1765, 1766], and which medications were even less than those 
necessary and considered appropriate by another County Mental 
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Health psychiatrist. [R. at 17651.6/ 
On February 25, 1984, Trujillo's aunt, a nurse employed in a 
psychiatric ward at Pioneer Valley Hospital, called County Mental 
Health, claiming Trujillo had slit her wrists, was threatening 
suicide and requesting that Trujillo be hospitalized because her 
family could not handle her. [R. at 1893; Aff'd. of Dorothy 
Candelaria; R. at 1713]. County Mental Health referred Trujillo 
to the Medical Center but told her aunt that "no county beds were 
available," [R. at 1893], purportedly referring to a contractual 
arrangement between County Mental Health and the Medical Center 
through which the Medical Center served as the "in-patient unit" 
for County Mental Health. [R. at 2082-2096]. However, when 
deposed, the Supervisor of County Mental Health responsible for 
the telephone service, testified that "no county beds available" 
really meant there were "no beds available for people who had no 
funds to pay." [Depo. of Sue Fisher, p. 32]. 
Trujillo and her mother went to the Medical Center on 
February 25, 1984. At the time of their arrival, Trujillo's chief 
-County Mental Health followed the substandard procedure of 
allowing a nurse to prescribe medications and have a doctor at a 
later time sign the record for legal purposes. Dr. Kuentzel 
admitted in his deposition that nurses prescribed medication for 
Trujillo; and the records show he personally evaluated her only 
one time in 1977. Dr. Kuentzel admitted he never devised a treat-
ment plan for Trujillo and never undertook to determine if 
Trujillo could follow through with treatments [Kuentzel Depo. Vol. 
1 Page 53, 55 and 72; R. at 2152]. Although the records show Dr. 
Kuentzel prescribed substantial psychotropic medications from 1977 
to 1984 for Trujillo, including an ineffective amount just before 
the stabbing, he swore under oath: "I have very little memory of 
Caroline Trujillo at all." [Kuentzel Depo. at 851. 
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medical complaint was a lacerated wrist from a suicide attempt. 
Both Trujillo and her mother requested that Trujillo see the 
"crisis people" [Ashcraft Depo. at 35; R. at 2370]]. Trujillo's 
mother specifically requested her daughter be admitted to the 
hospital because of her mental illness. [R. at 1701-1705]. 
The lacerated wrist was treated by Scott Lechman, a medical 
student not yet licensed to practice. Mr. Lechmanf although 
having no psychiatric training, recalled Trujillo as a "Hispanic 
woman sitting on a structure, accompanied by another person, with 
this wound on her wrist." He further recalled that Trujillo 
absurdly claimed to be "angry with God for about a year" and 
described her as "an obviously disturbed woman." [Lechman Depo. 
at 35-38]. 
Trujillo was then referred to Katy Jones, a "crisis 
specialist" and a registered nurse. Nurse Jones had never taken a 
course in treating mentally ill individuals with criminal back-
grounds and had only limited authority at the Medical Center. She 
was a part-time nurse who was not able to, for instance, admit a 
patient without consulting a physican. [Jones Depo. at 43, 50, 
and 56; R. at 2371]. 
Nurse Jones interviewed Trujillo and her mother using a 
procedure to assess Trujillo's condition that did not meet 
recognized standards of care. [Aff'd. of Dr. Moench; R. at 1761-
17671. Specifically, Nurse Jones did not review Trujillo's 
extensive medical records and file, [Jones Depo. at 81; R. at 
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2374] , so she did not even know Trujillo had four prior commit-
ments and was a dangerous paranoid schizophrenic. Nor did Nurse 
Jones even call a resident psychotherapist. [Jones Depo. at 110; 
R. at 2374]. 
Nurse Jones was advised by Trujillo1s mother that Trujillo 
had been "behaving in an erratic manner" [Jones Depo. at 85; R. at 
2374], "had episodes of self-abuse" including "head banging, 
bruising and cutting" [Jones Depo. at 85; R. at 2371], and was 
having "persistent auditory hallucinations" that "instruct her to 
harm herself and insist she must die." [Jones Depo. at 87; R. at 
2371]. Nurse Jones viewed Trujillo as having confusion in her 
thought processes, "intertwined with hallucinations and delu-
sions." [Jones Depo at 89-99; R. at 2374]. In fact, there was 
"turmoil going on in her head" with thoughts compromised by 
"hallucinations and delusions" while at the Medical Center. This 
type of hallucination precipitated the "self-inflicted lacera-
tion." [Jones Depo. at 90 -94; R. at 2374]. Finally, Nurse Jones 
found Trujillo was "tearful," her memory of recent and remote 
events was "poor" and her "insight and judgment was impaired." 
[Jones Depo. at 94; R. at 2379]. 
Despite this appearance and the existence of a recorded 
diagnosis of schizophrenia and violence, Nurse Jones reached a 
totally erroneous diagnosis that Trujillo was "depressed" and 
suffering from a minor "affective" disorder. [Jones Depo. at 
75-76; R. at 2379; Aff'd. of Dr. Moench, R. at 1761 to 1766]. 
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Nurse Jones thereafter lied to Trujillo's mother, telling her a 
bed was not available [R. at 1703-1704], even though the records 
establish beds were available [R. at 2112-2113] and there was no 
limit on the so-called "county beds." [Erickson Depo. at 109; R. 
at 2380]. Instead of taking the necessary and medically required 
steps to admit Trujillo, Nurse Jones referred her to County Mental 
Health for a "crisis" admit in a group home known as the Adult 
Residential Treatment Unit (ARTU). [R. at 1897]. Importantly, 
this referral violated the Medical Center's own policy that a 
psychotic or actively suicidal patient or a patient in need of 
constant supervision not be sent to ARTU. [R. at 2110]. 
ARTU was a minimally therapeutic setting without adequately 
qualified or sufficiently available staff to treat Trujillo. [R. 
at 1668]. It was not an appropriate substitute for the in-patient 
hospitalization Trujillo required. [Id; R. at 1761-1766]. Even 
the part-time psychiatrist at ARTU described it as not providing 
the degree of protection or the level of consistency of care of a 
hospital. [Ely Depo at 90; R. at 2376]. Nevertheless, Trujillo 
was referred to this "stepped down" facility on the basis that she 
could then be seen by Sheryl Steadman, her primary therapist; 
however, Sheryl Steadman never saw Trujillo while she was in ARTU. 
[Steadman Depo. at 139; R. at 2371]. 
Even though Trujillo's family did not believe the group home 
would help her, they took her there because they could not afford 
a private hospital and because they believed Trujillo would be 
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returned to the Medical Center once a bed became available. [R. 
at 1701-1712]. At the group home, Trujillo was met by a "crisis 
line" phone receptionist. The crisis line worker, who was not 
authorized to diagnose patients, [Romero Depo. at 40] conceived of 
and authored ARTU's "treatment plan" for Trujillo without the 
assistance of a physician and in contravention of County Mental 
Health's own policies and procedures. [Romero Depo. Vol. II. at 
p. 51. The "plan," developed without consultation with Ms. 
Steadman or Dr. Kuentzel and without review of Trujillo's medical 
records [Romero Depo. at 81], called for Trujillo to stay at ARTU 
for the short term in order to assess her living environment. 
[Romero Depo. Ex. 51. The plan was based upon the telephone 
worker's erroneous impression that Trujillo's main problem was 
simply, "manipulative, attention-seeking behavior." [Romero Depo. 
at 86]. 
While she stayed at ARTU for approximately the next sixteen 
days, Trujillo was never seen by the "responsible physician," Dr. 
William Kuentzel or by her "primary therapist," Sheryl Steadman. 
On two brief occasions she was seen by a Dr. Joy Ely, a part-time 
psychiatrist whose limited role was to evaluate ARTU residents for 
medications. [Ely Depo. at 22; R. at 2376]. Dr. Ely candidly 
admitted in her deposition that she had no training with mentally 
ill individuals with criminal backgrounds, was not involved in 
treatment plans for group home residents, was not involved in 
directly working with residents and had learned "quite quickly" 
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that the ARTU staff would not allow her to refer a resident for 
hospitalization. [Ely Depo. at 31, 32f 36 and 46; R. at 23761. 
Dr. Ely also evaluated Trujillo without medical records and 
without talking to Dr. Kuentzel. Her interviews were so limited 
she had no independent recollection of Trujillo. [Ely Depo. at 
138; R. at 2376]. She was able to interpret her notes of Trujillo 
that indicated Trujillo was "erratic" (inconsistent), "non-
adaptive" (not aware of what she was doing), "labile" (crying one 
minute, laughing the next, angry another time) and displaying a 
complete "lack of insight." [Ely Depo. at 69-75; R. at 2376]. 
Dr. Ely prescribed substantial increases in dosages of the psycho-
tropic medications Trujillo was taking for these problems, [Ely 
Depo. at 77; R. at 2376] but these increased dosages were never 
administered. [Stevens Depo. at 36; R. at 2382]. 
Trujillo's dramatic psychosis and symptoms continued while in 
ARTU. Once she left and returned within hours because she felt 
suicidal. [Whitaker Depo., Ex. 3, R. at 2373]. Another time she 
left "against" medical advice. [Ld.]. Trujillo again requested 
to be hospitalized at the Medical Center, but her request was 
denied. [R. at 2235]. 
Trujillo was sent home by ARTU on March 15, 1984, even though 
her family was reluctant to take her back because of the hallucina-
tions, delusions and violence. [Id.] The family took Trujillo 
back, however, because she "had no other place to go." [R. at 
Id.]. 
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At this time, Trujillo was placed as a patient in the 
"evening-weekend" program operated by County Mental Health. This 
program was not mental health treatment but was to provide a 
transition into the community from ARTU. [Steadman Depo. at 150; 
R. at 23711. Predictably, the therapist for the program did not 
see Trujillo after she left ARTU and Trujillo missed most of the 
"evening-weekend" sessions required by the program. [R. at 0177]. 
Indeed, at the very time Shaundra Higgins was stabbed, Trujillo 
was supposed to be in a recreational session for the program. [R. 
at 1757]. 
Trujillo was seen by Sheryl Steadman during a one-half hour 
appointment between the time she was released from ARTU and when 
she stabbed Shaundra. Steadman diagnosed Trujillo as being 
stable, in part because Trujillo indicated that she was starting a 
dish washing job arranged for her, [R. at 2235], which job 
Trujillo hysterically quit on her first day because the dishes 
were talking to her. [R. at 1708 to 17111 • Steadman did not 
alter Trujillo's medications, so they remained at an insufficient 
level to control Trujillo; and Dr. Kuentzel, following substandard 
procedures, approved this inadequate medication prescription 
without seeing Trujillo at all. [R. at 2235]. 
D. COUNTY MENTAL HEALTHS AND THE MEDICAL CENTER'S 
FAILURE TO MEET STANDARDS OF CARE IN CONTROLLING 
AND TREATING TRUJILLO• 
Appellant submitted uncontradicted affidavits from Dr. Louis 
A. Moench and Dr. Manya Attya to oppose the summary judgment 
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motions. These affidavits indicate Trujillo was a violent/ 
mentally ill patient that was negligently treated and controlled 
by Appellees in contravention to the recognized standard of care. 
Indeed/ in their affidavits/ Psychiatrists Moench and Attiya 
persuasively establish: 
1. Trujillo presented an unacceptably high 
level of risk at the time of the stabbing that 
she would act violently toward herself and 
others. 
2. The Appellees should have known, by a 
proper evaluation and diagnosis of Caroline 
Trujillo/ of the unacceptable high level of 
risk. 
3. The Appellees failed to properly assess 
and treat the risk because/ among other things: 
(a) they did not review medical records; 
(b) they did not involve experienced and 
qualified personnel to evaluate and diagnose 
Trujillo; 
(c) they failed to provide meaningful psychi-
atric intervention; 
(d) they allowed medication to be prescribed 
by non-psychiatrists which medication was less 
than that recommended to control Trujillof 
even by ARTU's own psychiatric doctors; 
(e) they did little to evaluate and diffuse 
Trujillo's propensities for violence; and/ 
(f) Appellees should have either voluntari-
ly or involuntarily hospitalized Trujillo for 
an extended period. 
4. Had the Appellees met the appropriate 
standard of caref Trujillo's psychosis would 
have been better controlled/ the risk for 
violence significantly reduced and it is 
unlikely this stabbing would have occurred. 
[R. at 1761-1767/ 2123-2126]. 
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From these expert opinions and evidence, a jury can easily 
find this tragic stabbing could and should have been avoided had 
the Appellees only met recognized standards of care. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case presents important issues concerning the duty of 
psychotherapists/mental health professionals to follow the 
standard of care in the profession and control and properly treat 
mentally ill and violent patients that injure innocent victims. 
A. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECIDING ON SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT THAT NO DUTY WAS OWED. 
Duty is a legal question that is fact-dependent in this case 
and requires a review of the facts. Almost all of the courts that 
have examined the question of the duty owed by psychotherapists/ 
hospitals to third parties have carefully reviewed the facts at 
trial. The lower court committed error in granting summary judg-
ment when there were extensive disputes of material fact. Doe v. 
Arguelles, 716 P.2d 179, 280 (Utah 1985). 
B. UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH 
AND THE MEDICAL CENTER OWED WELL-RECOGNIZED DUTIES 
TO KATHY AND SHAUNDRA HIGGINS TO CONTROL AND PROPERLY 
TREAT THEIR DANGEROUS PATIENT. 
Courts and commentators have recognized three bases upon 
which an affirmative legal duty is owed by psychotherapists/-
mental health care providers to innocent victims injured by their 
dangerous patients: 
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1. County Mental Health and The Medical Center Had a 
Special Relationship With Trujillo Requiring Them 
to Control and Properly Treat Her, 
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 315, an affirma-
tive duty is owed to victims of dangerous mental patients by 
psychotherapists/mental health care providers to control the 
actions of their dangerous patients as a result of the "special 
relationship" existing with their patients. The duty was owed in 
this case because of Trujillo1s relationship with County Mental 
Health and the Medical Center and their right or ability to 
control her. 
2. County Mental Health and the Medical Center Owed 
a Duty as Psychotherapists/Mental Health Care 
Providers to Use Reasonable Care to Take Precautions 
to Protect Kathy and Shaundra Higgins. 
Historically, health care professionals have had an affirma-
tive duty to protect the public from their dangerous patients. A 
large number of courts have extended this duty to the psycho-
therapists/mental health care providers to provide the necessary 
care and treatment to protect innocent victims from a dangerous 
and mentally ill patient. The duty is to meet reasonable 
standards of care, ordinarily possessed and exercised by members 
of the profession, to properly control and treat the patient. 
3. County Mental Health Owed Duties Arising Out of 
Two Court Sentences Placing Trujillo Into Its Care. 
Salt Lake County Mental Health owed duty, arising from its 
agreement to properly control and treat Trujillo when she was 
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placed into its care as a probationer under two criminal sen-
tences. County Mental Health agreed but failed to provide the 
treatment and then caused probation to terminate by falsely re-
porting to probation authorities that Trujillo had been treated 
and would continue to receive mental health treatments. Shaundra 
Higgins has an actionable claim arising out of the failure to 
provide the court-ordered treatments and accurate information to 
probation authorities. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT'S HOLDING VIOLATES OPEN ACCESS 
TO COORT, DDE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES 
OF THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS. 
The District Court's holding in this case violates open 
access to court, due process and equal protection guarantees of 
the Utah and United States Constititions because it deprives the 
plaintiff of a remedy at law for her injuries and unfairly 
discriminates against victims who are injured by health care 
providers who breach accepted standards of care and by making a 
certain group of "therapists" immune from suit despite that 
breach. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
This case addresses important issues concerning the legal 
rights of Shaundra and Kathy Higgins, injured due to the negli-
gence of County Mental Health and the Medical Center, who were 
entrusted with the care of Trujillo, a mentally ill and violent 
patient. Specifically at issue is the question of the legal duty 
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owed by County Mental Health and the Medical Center to Kathy and 
Shaundra in the factual context of this case. Importantly, Kathy 
and Shaundra have not and are not seeking a ruling that County 
Medical Health and the Medical Center are strictly liable for all 
harmful acts committed by their mentally ill and dangerous 
patients. Rather, Kathy and Shaundra seek only to hold County 
Mental Health and the Medical Center responsible for breaching 
their duty to control and properly treat their patient, using the 
accepted standards of care, when that breach caused Shaundra to be 
7/ 
viciously stabbed.-
Recent Utah Supreme Court pronouncements and the majority of 
case law from other jurisdictions, as well as sound public policy, 
recognize a duty of psychotherapists and mental health care pro-
viders to victims of their mentally ill patients to use reason-
able care in diagnosing and treating patients that are known or 
should be known, in accordance with the standards of the psychi-
atric profession, to present a danger to themselves or others. In 
appropriate circumstances, this means the psychotherapist and 
mental health care provider must take reasonable precautions to 
control the patient, especially where the right or ability to 
control the patient is not at issue. 
— "Recognition of an affirmative duty owed persons other 
than the patient does not mean the psychiatrist is liable for the 
negligence of the patient. Rather, the psychiatrist will be 
liable only when his own negligence is responsible for the injury 
in question." Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988). 
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The compelling facts in this case present just such a circum-
stance. Trujillo voluntarily submitted to the control of County 
Mental Health and the Medical Center by seeking hospitalization 
for her illness. She also came directly under the control of 
County Mental Health because of the two court sentences placing 
her in its care. 
A. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND RULING THAT NO DUTY TO CONTROL 
AND PROPERLY TREAT TRUJILLO WAS OWED WHEN 
THERE WERE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment. As 
such, this Court gives no deference to the trial court's con-
clusions. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 
(Utah 1989). 
Also, fundamental to the consideration of this case is the 
propriety of awarding summary judgment despite the existence of 
disputed issues of material Fact. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). While 
"duty" is a legal question, it is also highly fact-dependent and 
requires a careful review of the facts. See e.g. Owens v. 
Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, almost all of 
the courts that have examined the question of the duty owed by 
psychotherapist/hospitals to third parties have done so only in 
the context of a full trial of the facts. See e.g. Perreira v. 
State of Colorado, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989); Naidu v. Laird, 539 
A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988). 
There were many disputes of material fact in the court below. 
The standard of review on summary judgment requires all facts and 
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all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom to be reviewed in the 
light most favorable to the appellant and her daughter/ with all 
doubts being resolved in their favor. Doe v, Arguelles, 716 P.2d 
179, 280 (Utah 1985). 
Under this standard, it is apparent that the lower court 
erred. When the uncontroverted facts are viewed in a light most 
favorable to the Kathy and Shaundra Higgins, it is undeniable that 
County Mental Health and the Medical Center owed a duty when the 
Appellees had the right and ability to control Trujillo and the 
standard of care required them to do so. The facts are clear that 
Trujillo was dangerous and mentally ill, that she presented an 
unacceptable risk of harm and that Appellees had the ability and 
right and did actually control her. Appellant is entitled to show 
at trial that the injuries suffered were proximately caused by 
Appellees1 failure to meet even the minimal standards of care 
imposed in this community in treating and controlling their 
patient. Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988). 
B. COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH AND THE MEDICAL CENTER OWED 
A DUTY TO CONTROL AND PROPERLY TREAT TRUJILLO SO 
AS NOT TO INJURE KATHY AND SHAUNDRA HIGGINS UNDER 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
The courts which have considered the question of the affirma-
tive duty owed by psychotherapists and mental health care pro-
viders to innocent victims provide three bases that give rise to a 
"duty." The first recognizes that certain relationships provide 
for legal duty: "The relationship giving rise to that duty may be 
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found either in that existing between the therapist and the 
patient [citation ommitted] or in the more broadly based obliga-
tion the practitioner may have to protect the welfare of the 
community." Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12 (N.J. Super. 
1973). See also Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988). 
In addition, the courts have imposed a duty running to victims 
when a mental health care provider such as County Mental Health 
agrees to provide mental health care for a mentally ill proba-
tioner with a history of violence. Semler v. Psychiatric 
Institute of Washington D.C., 538 F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir. 1976), 
cert, denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1977); see also Whalen v. State of 
Nevada, 679 P.2d 248 (Nev. 1984); Payton v. United States, 679 
F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982). 
Appellant's claims are founded upon these three bases. 
Appellant carefully alleged that County Mental Health and the 
Medical Center breached the duty created by their special relation-
ship with Trujillo, by their professional obligations and by the 
agreement to provide care and treatment to Trujillo under the two 
sentencing orders. 
1. The Special Relationship Between Trujillo and County 
Mental Health and the Medical Center Gave Rise to a 
Duty to Shaundra and Kathy Higgins to Meet Appropriate 
Standards of Care in Controlling and Treating Trujillo. 
The first and most frequently relied upon basis to impose 
legal duty is set forth as an exception to the proposition found 
in Section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that absent a 
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"special relationship" there is no duty to control the conduct of 
a third person to prevent physical harm to another. Owens v. 
Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 1189 (Utah 1989). The Utah Supreme Court 
has established that a "special relationship" cannot be determined 
in the abstract but applies to different situations from which 
legal rights and obligations flow: 
Determining whether one party has an 
affirmative duty to protect another from the 
other's own acts or those of a third party, 
requires a careful consideration of the 
consequences for the parties and society at 
large. If the duty is realistically incapable 
of performance, or if it is fundamentally at 
odds with the nature of the party's relation-
ship, we should be loath to determine that 
relationship "special" and to impose a result-
ing "duty" for it is meaningless to speak of a 
"special relationship duty" in the abstract. 
These terms are only labels which the legal 
system applies to different situations to 
indicate that certain rights and obligations 
flow from them; they are "an expression of the 
sum total of those considerations of policy 
which lead the law to say that a particular 
plaintiff is entitled to protection. W. 
Prosser, Law of Torts, 333 (3rd Ed. 1964), 
quoted in Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 
138 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 
909, 100 S.Ct. 1836, 64 L.Ed.2d 261 (1980). 
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 418 (Utah 1986). 
Most commentators and almost all courts have recognized the 
relationship of a hospital or psychotherapist and a dangerous 
mental patient as such a "special relationship." This is because 
such a relationship typically allows for the right or ability to 
control the patient and the standard imposed on the psycho-
therapist or health care provider is only that which is recognized 
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in the community. Thus, the duties imposed are realistically 
capable of performance and are commonly accepted and understood. 
Indeed, where the patient seeks treatment and hospitalization, the 
duty is in harmony and not at odds with the nature of the relation-
ship. See Prosser and Keaton, Law of Torts, P. 383-384 (1985) 
(hospitals and psychotherapists who have charge of dangerous 
patients have a duty to control their charges and to guard other 
persons against their charges1 dangerous propensities. See also 
Harper and Kind, The Duty To Control The Conduct Of Another, 43 
Yale L.J. 886 (1984). 
Under the Restatement approach a duty exists to control and 
properly treat a patient even where the patient is deemed to be 
"voluntary." In these instances, the courts impose a standard of 
reasonable care to protect victims against the voluntary patient's 
acts whenever the psychotherapist has reason to forsee, in accord-
ance with accepted psychiatric standards, that the patient pre-
sents an unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to others.- The 
only departure from this rule is made in a limited number of cases 
where the assailant is classified as "voluntary," is resistant to 
- See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Universty of California, 
supra, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (imposing duty to take reasonable 
precautions where the assailant was voluntary out-patient); 
Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (1979) (psychotherapist respons-
ible for voluntary acts of out-patient); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck 
and Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 187 (D. Neb. 1980) (V.A. Hospital 
responsible for voluntary out-patient previously in day care 
treatment); Bradley Center, Inc., v. Wessner, 296 S.E. 2d 693 
(1982) (private mental health hospital owed duty to control 
patient upon accepting voluntary admission). 
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treatment and has little or no history of violence.- But even the 
cases making the "voluntary patient" distinction recognize that in 
certain circumstances, the psychotherapist/ voluntary relationship 
will give rise to a duty to protect a third party.— Those 
circumstances generally are based upon the psychotherapist's 
ability or right to control the patient, the patient's mental 
health and the patient's history of violence. 
The recent and well-reasoned decision in Perreira v. State, 
768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989) analyzes most of the special relation-
ship cases in this area and indicates they can be understood by 
employing a continuum reflecting factual situations with different 
levels of control over the patient. 
The Perreira Court indicates that at one end of the continuum 
are factual situations involving involuntarily committed mentally 
ill patients who have violent propensities. Perreira v. State, 
-See, for example, the cases cited by the Appellees in the 
Court below. Cooke v. Berlin, 735 P.2d 830 (Ariz. App. 1987) (no 
history of violence, not seeking hospitalization and no ability 
or opportunity to control conduct); Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 
1333 (D. Colo. 1983), Aff'd. 751 F.2d 329 (1984) (no history of 
violence and not seeking hospitalization); Abernathy v. United 
States, 773 F.2d 184, 189 (1985) (no history of violence and not 
diagnosed as dangerous); Hasenai v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 
999 (D. Md. 1982) (resistant to treatment and hospitalization). 
—'Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983) (it is 
implicit in the majority of cases in this area that the therapist/ 
patient relationship is one which under certain circumstances will 
give rise to a duty on the part of the therapist to protect third 
persons from harm); Hasenai v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999 (D. 
Md. 1982) (implicit in the exception to Section 315, however, is 
the proposition that such a special relationship must include the 
right or ability to control another's conduct). 
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supra at 1212. — ' In that instance, where the right and ability 
to control the patient is established, a greater duty of care is 
imposed. Perreira v. State, supra at 1213; Naidu v. Laird, supra 
at 1064. This case fits within this standard. 
"At the mid-point in the continuum are cases involving a 
mentally ill person who voluntarily seeks psychiatric treatment in 
a hospital as an in-patient." Id. at 1211. The majority of cases 
in this area impose a duty to take reasonable precautions— 
including temporary retention or commitment—to protect potential 
victims from the patient's violent propensities. 1(3. at 1212. 
This is elementary because when a voluntary patient seeks hospital-
ization for his mental illness, questions and problems of the 
right and ability to control or assess dangerousness evaporate. 
Indeed, where a voluntary mentally ill out-patient who has violent 
propensities seeks hospitalization, the health care provider "is 
under a duty to establish control." Hasenai v. United States, 541 
F. Supp. 999, 1012 N.23 (D. Md. 1982) (citing Greenburg v. 
Barbour, 322 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1971). This case also fits 
within this standard. 
On the other end of the continuum is a situation, not present 
in this case, where there is a limited right to control a patient 
— "Once a mentally ill person has been involuntarily 
committed to a mental health facility, the treating psychatrist 
has adequate opportunity to learn of the patient's condition, 
including any propensity to violence, and the corresponding 
ability to prolong the patient's confinement in the interest of 
the patient's safety and the safety of others." 
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and a limited opportunity to observe the patient's violent pro-
12/ pensities. Perreira v. State, supra at 1210.— These cases 
usually include voluntary out-patients who refuse hospitalization 
and have no prior history of violence. In those instances, the 
duty imposed is correspondingly limited, e.g. a duty to warn when 
13/ 
a specific threat is made against an identifiable victim.— 
The cases from the Utah Supreme Court that address liability 
of actors for the conduct of another are generally consistent with 
— "Because in these cases the therapist is treating the 
mentally distubed person as a voluntary out-patient and has 
limited opportunity to observe and determine the patient's violent 
propensities, and even less opportunity to control the patient's 
behavior, some court's have limited the duty to take protective 
action to those instances in which the patient makes a specific 
threat against a readily identifiable victim, e.g. Thompson v. 
County of Alameda. . .; see also Brady v. Hopper. . . . " 
13/ 
— The duty to warn cases have been criticized because 
they focus on the wrong issue: 
The query as to who might be the appropriate 
party to warn in light of a general threat to 
the public is, for the most part, a mis-
directed question. Specifically, where a 
patient's dangerous tendencies are imminent 
yet generalized, the only effective resource 
for the psychiatrist or psychologist, in most 
instances, would be to contact the police in 
order to initiate emergency detention proceed-
ings. Society must not become the victim of a 
dangerous patient's ambiguity. Stated other-
wise: "In some circumstances, when the po-
tential victim is an unidentifiable individual 
or group (as in the Lipari case), the only 
responsible intervention may be clinical—for 
example, hospitalization. 
Schuster v. Altenburg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 172-173 (Wis. 1988). 
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this analysis. A negligent actor in Utah may be liable for con-
duct which causes harm to an innocent victim. Doe v. Arguelles, 
716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985) (Corrections Officers liable where re-
leased juvenile violently injures fourteen-year-old non-identified 
victim); Little v. Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 
1983) (Division of Family Services liable for wrongful death of a 
child placed in foster home). 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has recently indicated a 
relationship like the one in this case is a "special relationship" 
under the Restatement approach. In Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 
1187 (Utah 1989) the Court used the Restatement approach to 
determine the State owed no duty to control a babysitter that 
abused a child where there was no meaningful relationship between 
the State and the babysitter. In reaching its conclusion, the 
Court found that a more significant relationship was necessary for 
duty and cited cases relied upon by the Appellant throughout this 
litigation to show the "special relationship" in this case 
sufficient to impose duty. Peterson v. State, 671 P.2d 230 (Wash. 
1983) (recognizing duty arises out of psychotherapist and mental 
health patient relationship); Division of Corrections v. Neakok, 
721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1987) (recognizing special relationship 
between parole officer and parolee). 
Appellant asserts that the evidence indicates the right or 
ability to control as being uncontestable is this case. First, 
Trujillo was in the care of County Mental Health by virtue of 
Court-ordered sentences. County Mental Health agreed to and 
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assumed a duty to treat Trujillo as the Court ordered and to make 
full and accurate reports to probation authorities. Thus, there 
was no question of control. See Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 
1213 (Colo. 1989) (involuntary commitment imposes duty); Naidu v. 
Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988) (duty where patient committed). 
Second, Trujillo voluntarily sought and requested hospitaliza-
tion. She actually relinquished control to County Mental Health 
and the Medical Center, who exercised control by referring her to 
the emergency room for treatment, evaluating her, referring her to 
ARTU, treating her at ARTU, a residential program and sending her 
back into the same environment where it was inevitable she would 
stab the child about which she had been brooding for six months. 
Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999, 1012 n.23 (D. Md. 
1982) (duty to establish control); Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F. 
Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
Third, Trujillo was a Utah resident entitled to receive 
mental health services as a patient of a mental health system, in 
which Appellees had a critical role, that had the responsibility 
to supervise and treat the mentally ill. Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-7 
(1977). In addition, the Medical Center had the responsibility 
under statute to provide emergency services without discriminating 
with regard to sex, race or prior inquiry as to the ability to 
pay, Utah Code Ann. § 26-8-1 et seq. and the Medical Center had 
the duty, as a publicly funded hospital, to provide services to 
all persons. Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 et seq. 
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Fourth/ County Mental Health and the Medical Center had the 
legal right to control Trujillo. The Utah Mental Health Statutes 
in 1984 provided for admission of a voluntary patient for care and 
observation. Section 64-7-29 of the Utah Code Ann, stated that a 
"mental health facility [including by designation County Mental 
Health and the Medical Center] . . . may admit for observation, 
diagnosis/ care and treatment any individual who is mentally ill 
or has symptoms of mental illness. . . .,f In addition, section 
64-7-31 of the Utah Code Ann, provided that the Appellees may 
exercise control over a patient to restrict release if conditions 
warrant. The Appellees could even hold a patient who demanded 
release for up to forty-eight hours during which time they could 
try to persuade the patient to continue in the hospital/ to be 
voluntarily committed/ or so that involuntary commitment pro-
cedures could be commenced. Lipari v. Searsy 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. 
Neb. 1980) (duty to initiate reasonable precautions including 
commitment); Williams v. United Statesf 450 F. Supp. 1040 (D. S.D. 
1978) (duty to seek involuntary commitment).— 
—'in 1988/ the Utah Legislature passed Utah Code Ann. § 
78-14 (a)-101 et. seq. which became effective on April 25/ 1988. 
The law provides a "therapist" [as defined] has no duty to warn or 
take prevautions for violent behavior of a client/ except where 
there is a threat and a reasonably identifiable victim/ which duty 
can be discharged by communicating the threat to he victim and law 
enforcement agencies. The legislative history of the law indi-
cates it was introduced in a much different form that gave 
"therapists" total immunity when a patient injured a victim. 
Strong objection and explicit debate narrowed the law so that it 
would not apply to a case like this one where professional 
standards were breached. [R. at 2296/ 2304-2308/ 2310-2315]. Of 
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Thus, there is no question or problem of the Appellees1 right 
or ability to control Trujillo. Accordingly, the duty owed was 
one of reasonably care to protect Appellant and her daughter from 
the dangers of their mentally ill patient. The evidence shows the 
Appellees breached this duty by failing to provide full pro-
fessional evaluation of Trujillo, by failing to admit her for 
treatment, by failing to detain her to be voluntarily committed, 
and by failing to detain her for a period to permit involuntary 
commitment. Appellant is now entitled to demonstrate this breach 
proximately caused her injury. See Littleton v. Good Samaritan 
Hospital and Health Center, 529 N.E.2d 449, 460 (Ohio 1988); Naidu 
v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988); Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d 
320 (Wash. 1983); Lipari v. Sears, 497 F. Supp. 185, 190 (D. Neb. 
1980); Bradley Center, Inc. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982); 
Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 511 (N.J. 1979). 
2. County Mental Health and the Medical Center as 
Psychotherapist/Mental Health Care Providers Owed 
Duty to Use Reasonable Care to Take Necessary 
Precautions to Protect Kathy and Shaundra Higgins 
from Trujillo. 
The second basis the courts have used to impose duty is 
founded upon a health care provider's affirmative duty to protect 
others, including the general public, from its patients. 
(Cont.) course, the law cannot be applied because the Appellee 
institutions are not "therapists" under it and because it would 
violate the rule against retroactive application of substantive 
law. Stevens v. Hendersen, 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987). 
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Acknowledgement of this basis initially occurred in cases where 
patients had infectious or contagious diseases. Where a health 
sare provider negligently fails to diagnose a contagious illness, 
or fails to protect the public from an infected person by means of 
seclusion or other appropriate steps, the courts have unanimously 
recognized a cause of action against the health care provider by 
an injured third party who is infected by contact with the con-
tagious patient. Fosgate v. Corona, 330 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1974) 
(failure to diagnose epilepsy that injured person while patient 
driving); Tisdale v. Fields, 433 A.2d 212 (N.J.1982); Freeze v. 
Lemon, 210 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1973) (failure to diagnose epilepsy 
that injured persons when patient later had seizure while 
driving); Hofman v. Blackmon, 241 S.2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1970) (failure to diagnose tuberculosis); Gooden v. Tipps, 651 
S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (doctor prescribing Quaalude 
without caution liable to person injured by patient driving under 
the drug's influence); Warton Transport Corp. v. Bridges, 606 
S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. 1980) (trucking company may sue doctor for 
injury arising out of doctor's negligent physical examination of 
driver. 
Following these holdings, most courts have taken the logical 
step of imposing a similar liability on a health care provider who 
negligently fails to diagnose, treat or hospitalize mentally ill 
patients who have known violent propensities and who, as a result 
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of the health care provider's negligence/ injure third parties.— 
For instance, in Schuster v. Altenburgy 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. 
1988) the court faced a fact situation similar to this case. In 
Schuster, the plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for relief based 
on a psychotherapist's failure to commit and to properly diagnose 
and treat a voluntary patient, including the failure to prescribe 
proper medications to the patient and the failure to take reason-
able measures to protect members of the public from the patient's 
dangerous conduct. In holding that such a claim is proper, the 
Court reasoned: 
We can conceive of no reason why a psychia-
trist, as a specialist in the practice of 
medicine, should not be compelled, as are all 
other practitioners, to meet the accepted 
standard of care established by other practi-
tioners in the same class. 
Id. at 172. The Schuster Court also noted that the duty imposed 
is one of "reasonable care to protect a victim," which care in-
— Salt Lake County, citing the case of Ferree v. State, 784 
P.2d 149 (Utah 1989) in the trial court, attempted to invoke the 
"public duty" rule to suggest it could not be liable for failing 
to perform a breach of duty owed to the general public. In 
Ferree, the Court found corrections officials could not be liable 
to a member of the general public particularly where the plaintiff 
presented "no evidence" that the released offender had exhibited 
violent behavior to another. (Ic|. at 152). No case in the 
country has applied the "public duty" rule to the psychotherapist/ 
mental patient relationship. Indeed, one court has recently 
indicated the provision of psychiatric care is an exception to the 
rule. See e.g., Woodrow v. Benton County, 783 P.2d 1102 (Wash. 
App. 1989) (citing Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d 230 (1983) (psycho-
therapist/patient relationship a special relationship)). Of 
course, the facts show that this stabbing was not committed on a 
general member of the public but on a neighbor about whom Trujillo 
had been brooding. 
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eludes conventional clinical intervention such as reassessment, 
medical charges or hospitalization designed to relieve the 
patient's symptoms. Icl. at 168. The Schuster Court clarified the 
scope of the duty defined and stated that "the therapist need only 
exercise that degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily 
possessed by members of [that profession] under similar 
circumstances." Id. 
Other jurisdictions in cases similar to this one have had no 
difficulty holding mental health care providers/hospitals liable 
for their negligence in diagnosing and treating violent mental 
patients who injure third parties. See e.g. Clark v. State, 472 
N.Y.S.2d 170 (1984) (decision to not hospitalize a mentally ill 
patient not founded upon a careful examination of the patient and 
the medical record); Jablonski by Pauls v. United States, 712 F.2d 
391 (9th Cir. 1983) (assailant not involuntarily hospitalized 
because physicians negligently failed to obtain and review past 
medical records); Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12 (N.J. 
1973) (court recognized that hospital had duty to take reasonably 
necessary precautions to protect against violence of an out-
patient treated on weekly basis); Greenburg v. Barbour, 322 F. 
Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (failure to act within reasonable time 
to admit individual seeking hospitalization). See also Perreira v. 
State of Colorado, 769 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989); Naidu v. Laird, 539 
A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988); Peterson v. State of Washington, 671 P.2d 
230, 237 (1983); Lipari v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 497 F. Supp. 
185, 191 (D. Neb. 1980). 
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The reasoning in these cases is compelling. The duty that is 
imposed on the health care provider is simply the generally 
recognized duty owed by a professional practitioner, i.e. "to 
exercise that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care 
ordinarily possessed and exercised under similar circumstances." 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d at 
345, cited in Schuster v. Altenburg, 424 N.W.2d at 164; Mcintosh 
v. Milano, 403 A.2d at 511-12. 
A psychiatrist is not expected to render a 
fool-proof prediction of future violence. 
Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 192. On the contrary, 
"ttlhe concept of 'due care1 in appraising 
psychiatric problems, assuming proper 
procedures are followed, must take account of 
the difficulty often inevitable in definitive 
diagnosis." Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 
407, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1975). What is required 
of the psychiatrist is to exercise that reason-
able degree of skill and knowledge ordinarily 
possessed by practicing psychiatrists in 
arriving at an informed and realistic assess-
ment of the patient's present condition and 
propensity for violence. . . . 
Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d at 1217. 
This duty of exercising due care is consistently applied by 
the Utah Supreme Court which has recognized that public insti-
tutions have a duty of care and may be held liable for their 
negligent treatment of the mentally ill which results in harm to 
the patient or others. In Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 
1980), the Court refused to shield the Medical Center from a 
wrongful death suit brought by a father alleging the negligence of 
a state-employed psychologist in allowing his son to leave the 
hospital, which resulted in his son's suicide. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has cited, with approval, 
cases imposing similar duties upon health care professionals. See 
e.g. Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982)— / 
(negligence of mental health care provider is actionable in case 
1 7/ 
resulting in injury to third party); Peterson v. State, supra,— 
(holding a state hospital and its psychiatrists responsible for 
harm caused by mental patient who voluntarily left the hospital); 
Semler v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington D.C., 538 F.2d 121 
18/ (4th Cir. 1976)— (psychiatric institute and psychiatrists 
responsible when out-patient killed non-identifiable third party). 
The facts in this case reveal that the Appellees failed in 
their duties by, among other things, not reviewing Trujillo's 
substantial medical records, not involving qualified personnel in 
the treatment and evaluation of Trujillo, not evaluating 
Trujillo's threat of danger to others, not prescribing the proper 
medications to control Trujillo's psychosis and violence, and not 
admitting Trujillo to the Medical Center. 
3. County Mental Health Owed Duty to Shaundra and 
Kathy Higgins to Properly Treat Trujillo and to 
Convey Accurate Information to Probation Authorities 
Under Two Court Sentences. 
The third basis upon which duty is imposed on County Mental 
Health arises out of its role in the criminal justice system and 
—''Cited in Little v. Division of Family Services, 667 
P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). 
^
/Cited in Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989). 
^Cited in Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah 
1985). 
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its acceptance of Trujillo as a patient in accordance with court 
orders. The two Courts sentencing Trujillo in 1981, one resulting 
from Trujillo's prior stabbing, required Trujillo to receive 
mental health treatments through County Mental Health. In 
accepting Trujillo as a patientf County Mental Health was aware of 
her condition and agreed that she would receive the treatment the 
Court deemed necessary. 
It is clear that County Mental Health did not provide 
these treatments and Trujillo's condition and propensity for 
violence was not addressed. The County Mental Health failure to 
insure Trujillo met her probation conditions and received the 
necessary care and treatment breached a duty arising from the Court 
sentences. See Semler v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, 
D.C., 538 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1976) (psychiatric institute 
liable for failing to provide care necessary to mental patient 
under sentence requiring that care); Payton v. United States, 679 
F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982) (Complaint stated claim against Bureau of 
Prisons for failing to provide proper psychiatric care for 
prisoner/patient). 
Likewise, County Mental Health breached an actionable duty 
recognized by the courts to convey accurate information to 
sentencing authorities. The Court records indicate that even 
though Trujillo did not meet these probation conditions, County 
Mental Health falsely advised probation authorities that she had 
done so. 
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Hicks v, United States, 511 F.2d 407, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975) is 
on point. In that case, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death 
action seeking damages for the death of a patient's wife, who was 
shot by her husband after he was discharged from a government 
hospital. The hospital in Hicks, like County Mental Health here, 
was aware of the patient's violent psychological record but 
failed to properly represent the record in a letter to the Court. 
The assailant was released on the basis of the hospital's letter 
and later killed his wife. 
In affirming the judgment entered for the plaintiff, the 
Court of Appeals held that the hospital, in exercising due care, 
had the responsibility to accurately advise the Court and was 
"negligent" when it did not do so. 1(3. at 418. 
County Mental Health had the responsibility to accurately 
advise probation authorities about Trujillo, her abysmal compli-
ance with court-ordered mental health treatments and her propens-
ity for violence when she was placed into an unstructured setting. 
They failed to fulfill this responsibility resulting in the 
termination of her probation with no constraints on Trujillo and 
the placement of Trujillo in the environment where she would 
inevitably become psychotic and violent. Shaundra Higgins now has 
a claim based on County Mental Health's breach of duty in not 
treating Trujillo in accordance with her probation conditions and 
in not properly advising probation authorities about her. 
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C. THE RULING BELOW VIOLATES THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION 
THE DOE PROCESS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES 
OF THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS. 
To rule that no duty was owed under the circumstances of this 
case, as the lower court did, violates the Open Courts Provision 
of the Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 11, and the due 
process and equal protection guarantees of the Utah and United 
States Constitutions, U.S. Constitutional Amendment XIV, Utah 
Constitution, Article 1, Section 7, Utah Constitution, Article 1, 
Section 24. 
The lower court's ruling effectively denies Appellant access 
to the judicial process without meaningful alternatives and 
effectively eliminates "remedies designed to protect basic 
individual rights without sufficient justification." Berry by 
and Through Berry v. Beach Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). 
This violates Utah's Open Courts Provision found at Section 11 of 
the Constitution's Declaration of Rights which "specifically 
guarantees a remedy by due course of law for injuries to a person, 
property or reputation." Berry at 675. 
Furthermore, the lower courts' order violates the due process 
guarantees of the Utah Constitution applicable under the Open 
Courts Provision because the Appellant's right to recover for 
personal injuries is a substantive right that is guaranteed by 
Article 1, Section 11, Condemarin v. The University Hospital, 775 
P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). This is particularly true because there is 
no meaningful alternative allowed to seek redress for injury and 
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the ruling favors psychotherapists/mental health care providers' 
economic interest in avoiding liability over the Appellant's 
interest in recovering damages. Sun Valley Water Beds v. Hughes & 
Sons, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989). 
Finally, the ruling below violates equal protection guaratees 
by unconstitutionally treating persons in the same class different-
ly. First, the ruling discriminates between victims who are 
injured by health care providers who breached accepted standards 
of care. Second, the ruling discriminates by making a certain 
group of professionals immune from suit despite their departure of 
standards of care. See e.g. Condamerin v. The University 
Hospital, supra, (Stewart, J.). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant and her daughter submit that County Mental Health 
and the Medical Center owed them the duty of controlling and 
properly treating their dangerous and mentally ill patient and 
respectfully request the Court reverse the summary judgments and 
remand this case for trial. 
DATED this 3 day of December, 1990. 
STOKER & THOMAS CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
James L. Warlaumont 
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Tab A 
A F F I D A V I T 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Dr. Louis A. Moench states as follows: 
1. I am a general and forensic psychiatrist licensed to 
practice in the State of Utah. I am aware of the standard of care 
in this community for evaluating and treating the mentally ill 
with violent propensities. 
2. I have reviewed a large volume of documents outlining the 
psychiatric, treatment, and criminal history of Caroline Trujillo 
as it relates to the stabbing of Shaundra Higgins. In particular, 
I have reviewed the evaluation and treatment records from the 
University of Utah, where Ms. Trujillo was seen in the emergency 
room and hospitalized on four occasions; trie Utah State Hospital, 
where Ms. Trujillo was hospitalized three times; and, Salt Lake 
County Mental Heath, where Ms. Trujillo was evaluated and treated 
individually and in residential placement at various times from 
1976 through 1984. I have also reviewed the depositions of 
William Kuentzel, M.D., Joy Ely, M.D., Sheryl Steadman, R.N., Katy 
Jones, R.N., Lynn Whitaker and Larry Romero. 
3. Based on my review of the record and the depositions, the 
defendants in this case should have known, by a proper evaluation 
and diagnosis of Caroline Trujillo, that there was an unacceptably 
EXHIBIT 1A 
high level of risk that Caroline Trujillo at the time of the 
stabbing would act violently towards herself or others. Specifi-
cally, the records set forth above indicate: 
a. Caroline Trujillo, since her teens, had been 
diagnosed as having a major mental illness, schizophrenia, 
paranoid type, as well as organic brain dysfunction, and marginal 
intelligence. In addition, her behavior fit in a category of 
anti-social personality disorder. 
b. Ms. Trujillo had been described in the records by 
psychiatrists as hostile, dangerous, having an explosive person-
ality disorder, disorganized in her behavior, confused in her 
thoughts, inappropriate in her mood, lacking insight into a need 
for medication, and lacking any commitment to self-therapeutic or 
self-betterment goals. Psychotic symptoms were prevalent near the 
time of the stabbing, including hallucinations of voices derogat-
ing herself, halluciations telling her to narm herself, and para-
noid delusions. 
c. Unlike most schizophrenics, Caroline Trujillo had a 
substantial history of violent behavior. This set her apart as 
someone needing extra attention and precautions. There were 
episodes of random assaults on strangers, including a prior 
stabbing. There were many episodes of assaults on patients and 
staff, during prior hospitalizations, necessitating seclusion and 
restraint. 
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d. Caroline Trujillo1s assaultiveness was attributable 
to the features of her mental illness and not merely to "bad 
acting" of a voluntary nature. 
e. When medication in proper type and dosage was given 
in conjunction with an inpatient environment her symptoms of 
psychosis were markedly reduced and propensities for violence 
diminished. In the several months prior to the stabbing, Ms. 
Trujillo's medication and environment were not sufficient to 
control her psychotic symptoms and her propensity for violence. 
f. For at least four months before the stabbing of 
Shaundra Higgins, Caroline Trujillo displayed obvious signs of 
psychotic relapse as indicated by: (i) The persistence of 
auditory hallucinations; (ii) aberrant behavior/ including self-
harmful acts; (iii) confusion and thought disturbances; and, (iv) 
erratic use of medications and failure to appreciate her need for 
them* 
4. The defendants should have known that Caroline Trujillo 
posed an unacceptably high level of risk of bodily harm to others, 
which risk was not properly assessed and treated because: 
a. The crisis nurse at the emergency room did not review 
records which would have alerted her that Caroline Trujillo was a 
paranoid schizophrenic with organic brain damage and a history of 
violence due to her illness and had required involuntary hospitali-
zation four times. 
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b. The crisis nurse misdiagnosed Caroline Trujillo as 
"depressed" and suffering from an "affective disorder," a con-
clusion she should not have reached had she reviewed the records, 
or more carefully evaluated Miss Trujillo. 
c. The crisis nurse failed to properly interview avail-
able family members about Caroline Trujillo and her history. 
d. The crisis nurse failed to inquire as to prior 
history of violence. 
e. The crisis nurse failed to consult with the 
psychiatric resident on call. 
f. The crisis nurse improperly referred Caroline 
Trujillo to the Adult Residential Treatment Unit ("ARTU"), a 
minimally therapeutic setting without adequately qualified or 
sufficiently available staff to treat her illness at that time. 
g. No record was made of any consxderation or evaluation 
at the hospital or ARTU as to Miss Trujillo's potential for repeat-
ing past violence. 
h. There was little evidence of meaningful psychiatric 
intervention. A psychiatric resident or physician was not in-
volved at the emergency room, and Dr. Joy Ely's role at the ARTU 
Unit was very limited. There is no indication that Dr. Ely partici-
pated in a treatment plan beyond the prescribing of medication and 
Joy Ely indicated that Salt Lake County Mental Health would not 
allow her to do more than that. 
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i. The responsible physician for Caroline Trujillo at 
Salt Lake County Mental Health, Dr. William Kuentzel, did not 
examine Ms. Trujillo in 1984. The record shows Dr. Kuentzel had 
only one psychiatric evaluation in the seven years of treatment of 
Caroline Trujillo at Salt Lake County Mental Health. This is so 
even though Dr. Kuentzel authorized antipsychotic medications for 
much of this period. Psychiatric evaluations at three month 
intervals are considered necessary by the Joint Task Force on 
Community Psychiatry of the National Council of Community Mental 
Health Centers and the American Association of Community Psychia-
trists in Association with Committees of the American Psychiatric 
Association, especially for the severely mentally ill, to monitor 
the efficacy of, tolerance to, and need for medication, and to 
supervise the formulation and modification of treatment plans. 
j. Likewise, psychotropic medication evaluation and 
prescription, including dosage changes, must be performed by a 
psychiatrist. Medication decisions for Caroline Trujillo were 
mostly made by Sheryl Steadman, who lacked the qualifications or 
experience necessary. 
k. Despite the recommendations by a psychiatrist at ARTU 
that Caroline Trujillo's medications be increased to control her 
symptoms, it does not appear that increases were administered. 
1. There is little recorded evidence that any attention 
was paid to evaluating or diffusing propensities for violent 
behavior through County Mental Health, and especially through 
ARTU. 
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m. The treatment plan for Caroline Trujillo developed at 
ARTU was not sufficient because it included mainly elements with 
which Caroline had not complied in the past and family therapy 
which never occurred. 
n. Larry Romero, who was principally assigned to 
Caroline Trujillo at ARTU, had no experience with Ms. Trujillo and 
was not qualified to devise a treatment plan for a suicidal, 
schizophrenic, actively psychotic patient. Sheryl Steadman, who 
knew Ms. Trujillo, was involved inadequately in her disposition 
and treatment at ARTU and made no change in the treatment plan 
after discharge to respond to her intensified distress. 
o. Caroline Trujillo was a known abuser of heroin and 
amphetamines. There was a failure to deal seriously with sub-
stance abuse in her treatment and there were no serious attempts 
to intervene in her drug use though amphetamines may have 
contributed to her paranoid psychosis. On the day of the 
stabbing, it is reported that Caroline Trujillo smoked marijuana. 
Therefore, abuse was apparently still occurring. 
5. There is clear evidence that Caroline Trujillo gradually 
improved when psychotic relapses were treated by a highly struc-
tured, inpatient hospital setting, with an increase in her antipsy-
chotic medications. At the time of the stabbing, her medication 
dose was materially less than that most recently recommended by a 
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psychiatrist to control her symptoms. In light of her psychotic 
statef the low dosage of medications was not sufficient to control 
her violence. 
6. In my opinion, the minimum standard of care for Caroline 
Trujillo, given the psychotic symptoms she displayed on February 
25, 1984
 f and her past history of violence when psychotic, 
required inpatient psychiatric treatment. Past history of gradual 
response to extended inpatient treatment indicates that her 
psychosis would have been better controlled and risk for violent 
behavior significantly reduced had she been hospitalized. 
DATED this 1 ^ day of ^eph>mbec 1989. 
Louis A. Moench, M/.D. 
1989. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /sT day of QspfeiiUc- / 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: Residing at: 
TabB 
A F P I D A V I T 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
: S3. 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
Dr. Manya Attiya states as follows: 
1. I am a psychiatrist licensed to practice in the State of 
Utah and have been since 1972. 
2. I was employed as a psychiatrist for Salt Lake County 
Mental Health for the years 1981 through 1985. 
3. As part of my duties as a psychiatrist for Salt Lake 
County Mental Health I worked in the Salt Lake County Jail. I 
assessed, evaluated and diagnosed the mentally ill with violent 
propensities. 
4. I have served as a psychiatrist in many civil proceedings 
for the involuntary hospitalization of individuals who were 
mentally ill and posed an immediate danger to themselves or others 
or needed custodial care or treatment. 
5. As a staff psychiatrist for Salt Lake County Mental 
Health, I assessed and evaluated Caroline Trujillo in the jail 
after two separate stabbings. The first occasion occurred in 1981 
after Caroline Trujillo had stabbed a senior citizen. I also 
assessed and evaluated Caroline Trujillo in 1984 after she had 
stabbed Shaundra Higgins. 
EXHIBIT I B 
6. I have reviewed my progress notes from these assessments 
and evaluations and I have reviewed documents arising out of 
Caroline Trujillo*s emergency room visit at the University of Utah 
Medical Center on February 25, 1984 and subsequent treatment at 
the Adult Residential Treatment Unit. 
7. Based on my review of these documents and my evaluations 
and assessments of Caroline Trujillo, my opinion is that Caroline 
Trujillo was mentally ill, dangerous and in need of care and 
treatment in an in-patient hospital setting in February, March and 
April of 1984. My assessments and evaluations and the records I 
have reviewed indicate: 
a. Caroline Trujillo suffered from a major mental 
illness, paranoid schizophrenia and was intellectually 
impaired. 
b. Caroline Trujillo was openly hostile and had a 
history of psychotic behavior. She acted out aggressively 
when pushed or bothered and required isolation cells to 
protect her from hurting others or from being hurt. 
c. Psychotic symptoms were present at the time of both 
stabbings. In particular, in 1984, Caroline responded to a 
voice telling her to stab someone to feel better. She was 
unable to control her thoughts at this time and had no idea 
why she acted out violently. 
8. The records further indicate that during February and 
March of 1984, the symptoms of psychosis that made Caroline 
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Trujillo dangerous were present* The records indicate a per-
sistence of auditory hallucinations instructing her to harm 
herself and insisting she must die, despite regular medication 
use. Her thought processes were confused and there are reported 
hallucinations and delusions. There are references to self-
inflicted lacerations and bruises with a suspicious mood and 
impaired insight and judgment. There is a continuation of suicide 
ideation and hostility even though placed in a residential treat-
ment setting. 
9. Further, Caroline Trujillo in 1984, had a past behavior 
that included violence and a prior stabbing. Caroline Trujillo, 
on the basis of this past behavior and on the basis of the present-
ment of violent behavior secondary to psychotic symptoms, required 
in-patient hospitalization, and no less restrictive environment 
was appropriate, including a residential placement at the Adult 
Residential Treatment Unit. ARTU was not sufficient to evaluate 
and assess Caroline Trujillo and her propensity for violence and 
properly treat Caroline Trujillo and did not properly treat 
Caroline Trujillo. 
9. Furthermore, my examinations of Caroline Trujillo demon-
strated that Caroline Trujillo gradually improved when her 
psychosis was treated by a highly-structured, in-patient hospital 
settingr with strict attention to anti-psychotic medications being 
paid. For instance, in 1981, the records reflect that after 
Caroline Trujillo was hospitalized at the Utah State Hospital for 
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approximately three months, her hostility and psychosis gradually 
improved. Likewise, in 1984 after eight and one-half months in 
the Dtah State Hospital, Caroline Trujillo1s violent thoughts 
improved. 
10. Accordingly/ in my opinion, the minimum standard of care 
for Caroline Trujillo, given the psychotic symptoms she displayed 
in February and March of 1984, and her past history of violence 
when psychotic, required extended in-patient psychiatric treatment 
for at least ninety days. The records indicate that Caroline 
Trujillo sought in-patient hospital treatment; thus, involuntary 
hospitalization was not necessary. In the event, however, that 
Caroline Trujillo opposed in-patient treatment, there was a sub-
stantial basis to initiate involuntary hospitalization procedures. 
Past history of gradual response to extended in-patient treatment 
indicates that Caroline Trujillo1s psychosis would have been 
better controlled in this manner and it is unlikely this stabbing 
would have occurred had she been hospitalized. 
DATED this /& day of August, 1989. 
Manya Att^ya, M/D. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this x^L—" day o f August, 
1989. 
TabC 
A F F I D A V I T 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1. I am the natural mother of Caroline Trujillo. 
2. Caroline began to use drugs in her early teens. The 
drugs made Caroline uncontrollable and caused Caroline to be 
hostile and act out. 
3. Caroline was first hospitalized in 1975 for her mental 
illness at the University of Utah. I was told by doctors at that 
time that the drugs Caroline had taken had damaged Caroline's 
brain and had made her a schizophrenic. 
4. Caroline's behavior since her early teens has been unpre-
dictable, and at times dangerous. She would often cry or scream 
hysterically for no reason. She heard voices that would tell her 
to hurt herself and make her act out. 
5. Caroline was involved in numerous violent and unpredict-
able incidents over the years. Caroline impulsively slashed her 
wrists and almost killed herself. She stabbed an elderly woman. 
6. Caroline was either in jail, hospitalized, on the street, 
or living with me from the time she was fourteen. When she lived 
with me, she would disappear for long periods of time and would 
then reappear in a battered condition. I was always very worried 
about her. I had nightmares that Caroline would be left dead on 
FYHinrr A 
our porch as a result of the fights and beatings that occurred. 
On one occasion when Caroline disappeared, I received a call from a 
young woman demanding monies because Caroline had stabbed her. 
This was an incident different from the other stabbings. 
7. Caroline did not understand her illness. She would not 
take medications that were prescribed unless someone made her and 
made sure she took them when she was supposed to. Caroline was not 
capable of attending therapy sessions set up for her. Caroline 
could not and never did hold a job. Caroline could not care for 
herself or the two children that were born to her. The two chil-
dren were taken from her and were adopted because Caroline could 
not care for them. When Caroline lived with us, we could not leave 
her at home with our other children because of the danger she 
presented. 
8. Caroline suffered from hallucinations and delusions. 
These hallucinations made her act in a bizarre way. She would 
violently hit herself, scream in terror and bang her head against 
the wall. She did this even though she took the medications that 
were given to her. The medications did not seem to help. 
9. My husband and I tried over and over to get long-term 
inpatient treatment for Caroline. It seemed that for Caroline to 
get treatment, she had to be picked up by the police. Caroline 
was hospitalized at the University of Utah in 1975 when she told 
the police that my husband and I were trying to kill her brothers 
and sisters. Caroline was hospitalized in 1978 after she left her 
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ten-day-old daughter at Holy Cross Hospital and did not tell the 
Hospital who she was. At the time Caroline claimed the baby had a 
broken neck. Just after this, Caroline was sent to the State 
Hospital at my request. Caroline was arrested for stabbing an 
elderly lady in 1981 and was sent to the State Hospital for a 
second time. 
10. I signed commitment papers in an effort to have Caroline 
hospitalized for an extended period, but Caroline was never placed 
in the hospital for a sufficient time period to help her. It 
seemed the hospitals would always let her out even though she was 
not better and was still acting out. 
11. At the time, I was very angry that I could not get my 
daughter hospitalized. Once I went to the Sugarhouse unit of 
Salt Lake County Mental Health and demanded Caroline be hospital-
ized. I was told that I would have to talk to someone else. On 
several occasions I angrily had words with Sheryl Steadman and 
demanded that Caroline be hospitalized. 
12. Sheryl Steadman and the other people always passed the 
buck. They continually referred rae to someone else who would 
refer me to another person. The result was that Caroline did not 
receive the long-term hospitalization that she needed. 
13. My husband and I again requested that Caroline be hospital-
ized in February of 1984, Caroline slashed her wrists at that time 
with disposable razors we kept at home. We kept those type of razors 
so that Caroline could not kill herself. I took Caroline to the 
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University Hospital in order to get her cuts fixed so there would 
be no infection. I specifically requested that Caroline be 
hospitalized for her mental illness. 
14. Caroline and I met with a crisis worker in the emergency 
room. I told the crisis worker that: 
(a). Caroline had been hallucinating and was experienc-
ing delusions; 
(b) . The hallucinations and delusions caused Caroline 
to act out in a dangerous way, and resulted in her 
beating her head, hitting her chest and cutting 
herself; 
(c) . The medications that Caroline was taking did not 
control her or stop her from acting out. 
15. I specifically requested that Caroline be hospitalized as 
an inpatient. The crisis worker told me that there were no beds 
available at that time. I felt that the crisis worker did not 
really care about my daughter and was indifferent about her prob-
lems. I could not believe that this big hospital did not have any 
beds for my ill daughter. 
16. The crisis worker referred me to a group home called 
ARTD that was operated by Salt Lake County and told me Caroline 
could come back to the University when a bed was available. 
Caroline had been in the group home before and I did not feel it 
would help her since it had not helped her in the past and since 
it was apparent Caroline could not follow the rules of a group 
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home. But my husband and I could not afford to place Caroline in a 
private hospital. We had no alternative and took her to the group 
home until she could be transferred to the University Hospital at 
the time a bed became available. 
17. We told the crisis worker at the group home that we 
understood Caroline would be hospitalized at the University of Utah 
when a bed became available. We also told the worker that Caroline 
had a long-term mental illness and had been in trouble with the 
police in the past. We explained that Caroline suffered from 
hallucinations and delusions, and we were concerned she would 
attempt suicide. 
18. Even though we were told and requested that Caroline 
would be hospitalized, she never was. Caroline spent several days 
at the group home and was then sent home. At the time Caroline was 
picked up, we did not believe we could handle Caroline and told the 
persons at the group home. We also told the people that 
Caroline's hallucinations, delusions and violence would continue. 
It was clear to me and clear to the people at the group home that 
Caroline could not follow through with outpatient treatments. 
Since Caroline had no place to go, she came back into our home. 
19. Caroline continued to have problems after she came home. 
Someone arranged for a job for her as a dishwasher, which Caroline 
immediately quit because she could not handle it. Caroline claimed 
the dishes were talking to her. We picked her up when she quit 
and she was hysterically crying. A few days later, Caroline stabbed 
Shaundra Higgins. 
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20* Carolyn was mentally ill at the time she was taken to 
the University Hospital, the group home and at the time she 
stabbed Shaundra Higgins. She was totally unable to provide the 
necessities of life, including food, clothing and shelter. She 
had to be followed to make sure she took her medications. She 
could not weigh the costs and benefits of treatment. 
A J (Ul'L.-lA A / / 6 6 y > 2 ^ ^ 
'Rebecca Navarro 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s /Z day of May, 
1988. 
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A F F I D A V I T 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1. I am the step-father of Caroline Trujillo and have been 
since she was two years old. 
2. Caroline began to use drugs when she was fourteen years 
old. The drugs made Caroline uncontrollable and caused Caroline 
to be hostile and act out. 
3. Caroline was first hospitalized at the University of Utah 
in 1975. At that time, she claimed that my wife and I had killed 
our other children. I was told the doctors at that time indicated 
that the drugs Caroline had taken had damage J Caroline's brain and 
had made her a schizophrenic. 
4. Caroline was involved in numerous violent and unpredict-
able incidents over the years. On one occasion, Caroline 
impulsively slashed her wrists after I confronted her about drugs. 
On another, she stabbed an elderly woman. Once I had to go to 
Elko, Nevada to pick her up after a doctor called. Apparently she 
became uncontrollable while in a casino. 
5. Caroline was either in jail, hospitalized, on the street 
or living with me from the age of fourteen. When she lived with 
me, she would disappear for long periods of time and would then 
reappear in a battered condition. 
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6. Caroline did not understand her illness. She would not 
take medications that were prescribed for her unless someone made 
her. She was not capable of attending therapy sessions set up for 
her. She could not hold a job and could not care for herself and 
two children that were born to her. The two children were taken 
from her and were adopted because Caroline could not care for them. 
When Caroline lived with me and my wifef we could not leave her at 
home with our other children because of the danger she presented. 
7. Caroline suffered from hullcinations and delusions that 
made her act very strange. She would hear voices that would tell 
her to hurt herself and others. She would violently hit herself, 
scream in terror and bang her head against the wall. 
8. My wife and I tried over and over to get long-term 
inpatient treatment for Caroline. The only times that Caroline 
would be placed into an inpatient treatment program was when she 
had trouble with the police. On these occasions, Caroline was 
never placed in the hospital for a sufficient time period to help 
her. The hospitals would always let her out even though she was 
not better and was still acting out. 
9. In February of 1984 Caroline slashed her wrists. I took 
Caroline with my wife to an adult residential treatment unit after 
my wife had tried to have Caroline hospitalized at the University 
of Utah. 
10. At the adult residential treatment unit, we met with a 
crisis worker. We told the crisis worker it was our understanding 
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that Caroline would be allowed to go to the University when a bed 
was available. Caroline had been in the group home before and I 
did not feel it would help her because it had not helped her in 
the past, and because Caroline could not follow the rules of the 
group home. But we could not afford to place Caroline in a private 
hospital. We had no alternative but to take her to the group home 
until she would be transferred to the University at the time a bed 
became available. 
11. Caroline was never sent to the University Hospital. She 
spent several days at the group home and then was sent to our 
home. I advised the person at the group home that I was reluctant 
to take Caroline back because I did not feel her hallucinationsf 
delusions and violence would stop and that she would still create 
problems for our family. But Caroline had no other place to go, so 
we took her back into our home. 
12. After she came home, Caroline continued to have problems. 
She continued to beat herself and scream in the middle of the 
night. She took a job as a dishwasher and quit. I picked her up 
and she cried hysterically. Not long after she came home, Caroline 
stabbed Shaundra Higgins. 
13. I believe that Caroline was mentally ill at the time we 
took Caroline to the adult residential treatment unit and at the 
time she stabbed Shaundra Higgins. She was and had been totally 
unable to provide the necessities of life, including food, 
clothing and shelter. We had to follow her to make sure she took 
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her medications. She did not understand the nature of her illness 
and could not weigh the costs and^benefits of treatment. 
/ 
Richard Navarro 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this f May, 
1988. 
NOTARVPUBLIC 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1. I am an aunt of Caroline Trujillo. 
2. I am a nurse and have been employed on a psychiatric ward 
at Pioneer Valley Hospital since 1983. 
3. As the aunt of Caroline Trujillo, I have personal 
knowledge of her mental illness, her hostile and violent nature 
and the efforts undertaken by her family to obtain long-term 
institutionalized care for Caroline. 
4. After she first cut her wrists and attempted suicide, 
Caroline showed schizophrenic behaviors. She attempted suicide 
after police told her that her habitual drug use was addictive. 
As a result of her severe mental illness, Caroline was treated by 
Salt Lake County, through its Division of Mental Health, and the 
University of Utah. At times the care was due to involuntary 
commitments. During the periods she was treated: 
(a) Caroline engaged in self-mutilation and abuse, 
including suicide attempts. 
(b) Caroline assaulted and fought with other persons. 
(c) Caroline would leave home for long periods and would 
unexpectedly return with cuts, bruises and other 
wounds. 
(d) Caroline could not care for herself or her children 
who were eventually taken from her because Caroline 
could not care for them. 
f\#i nrviT f\ 
4. Caroline did not have insight into her illness or 
understand it* 
5. Caroline's history of acting out and violence resulted in 
her mother and step-father trying on many occasions to obtain 
long-term care for Caroline. Despite their efforts, the only 
long-term treatment Caroline received was medication administered 
by Salt Lake County Mental Health. The medication was not enough 
to control Caroline and did not help Caroline. 
6. In 1984f before and at the time of the stabbing of 
Shaundra Higgins, Caroline was predisposed to violent behavior and 
was dangerous. The slashing of her wrists in February of 1984 was 
an indication of her violence and dangerousness. 
7. In February of 1984 and at the time she stabbed Shaundra 
Higgins, Caroline was dangerous to herself and others. She was 
unable to provide the basic necessities of life, such as foodf 
clothing and shelter, and she lacked the ability to engage in 
decision making regarding the acceptance of mental treatment. 
Dorothy Candelaria 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of Mayf 1988. 
My Commission Expires: 
c ->-?<-* ^ -V . < ^ -
NOTARY PUBLIC , , > _ ' ' / , 7 
R e s i d i n g a t ; •^_.^ > C .'zl<<2< Lczs-rr 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
3y: PATRICIA J~ MARLOWE, #2084 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State, --S3400 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 34190-1200 
Telephone: :801) 468-3421 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHY LYNN HIGGINS, 
: JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
vs 
\ Civil Ho. 34-4921PI 
CAROLINE TRUJILLO, et ai., 
: Judge James S. Sawaya 
Defendants. : 
Defendants Salt Lake County, William Kuentzei and Sheryl 
Steadman's Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for 
hearing before- the Court, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, 
District Court Juage, presio^ng, on Karen 26, 19&0. Plamtifrs 
were representea by their attorneys, James 1. Wariaumont and 
David B. Thomas; defenaants University of Utah and University 
cf Utah Hospita± were representea by their attorney, Druce K. 
Jensen, and defendants Salt Lake County, William Kuentzei and 
Sheryl Steaaman were represented by their attorney, Patricia J. 
Marlowe, Deputy Salt LaKe County Attorney. The Court heard the 
arcuments of counsel and took the matter under advisement. 
.—vC/.V^- v , : W C U A ' 
The Court having reviewed the memoranda filed by the 
parties, having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, 
and being fully advised in the premises, and having previously 
issued its Minute Order granting summary judgment to defendants 
Salt Lake County, William Kuentzei and Sheryl Steaaman for the 
reasons that these defendants owed no duty to the plaintiffs, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that judgment is entered in favor of defendants Salt Lake 
County, William Kuentzei and Sheryl Steatiman. The Court find-
ing no reason for delay, directs the entry of Judgment against 
the plaintiffs and in favor of Salt Lake County, William 
Kuentzei and Sheryl Steadman, in accordance with Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 54(b). 
DATED this ,••- ^ day of April, 1990. 
BY THE COURT:. 
JAMES S. SAWAYA 
Third District Courz Juoge 
. .57T:CT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE '\? 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify thai: ± caused a true and correct copy of 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER to be nailed, postage prepaid thereon, this 
"3-ay of April, 1990 to the rollowing: 
James L. Warlaumont, Esq, 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt LaKe City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
David E. Thomas, Esq. 
STOKER & THOMAS 
311 South State Street, #440 
Salt Lake City, Utan 34111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Bruce H. Jensen 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
#10 Exchange Place 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for University of Utah and 
University of Utah Hospital 
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BRUCE H. JENSEN (A1667) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN a MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
University of Utah and 
University Hospital 
13 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah S4145 
Telephone: (601) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHY LYNN HIGGINS, 
individually and as SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Guardian ad Litem for 
SHAUNDRA HIGGINS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
MEDICAL CENTER and JOHN 
FOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment: of defendants University of 
Utah and University Hospital (incorrectly identified as The 
University Medical Center) came on regularly for decision before 
the above-entitled Court, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Rules of 
Judicial Administration. 
The Court, being fully advised m the premises having 
reviewed the pleadings, memoranda and discovery materials on file 
herein, having ordered publication cf all discovery depositions 
taken m this matter, and having heard the arguments of counsel 
Civil No. C84-4 921 
Judge James s. Sawaya 
for the parries after granting plaintiff's Request for oral 
Argument, hereby grants defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the ground and for the reason that the Court finds these 
defendants owed no duty to these particular plaintiffs under the 
circumstances of this case. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Summary 
Judgment is entered in favor cf defendants University of Utah and 
University Hospital and against plaintiff upon plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint, no cause of 
action. The Court, finding no just reason for delay, directs the 
entry of Judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of the 
University of Utah and University Hospital in accordance with 
Utah Rules of civil Procedure, Rule 54(b). 
DATED this /"• day of / -' - ''• '.
 r 1990. 
3Y THE COURT: 
JAMES S. 5AWAYA, District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
STOKER & THOMAS 
3y: 
DAVID B. THOMAS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
•,5\BHJY:M83.:::\S.J 
2 
CERTIFICATE 0? SERVICE 
I hereby certify that ± causeo a urue and correct copy of 
'DGMENT AND ORDER to be mailed, postage prepaid thereon, chis 
'day of April, 1990 to the following: 
James L. Warlaumont, Esq. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Lavic E. Thomas, Esc. 
STOKER <k THOMAS 
211 Soutn State Street, #440 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Bruce H. Jensen 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
#10 Exchange Place 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for University of Utah and 
University of Utah Hospital 
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RODNEY G. SNOW (3 028) 
NEIL A. KAPLAN (3974) 
JAMES L. WARLAUMONT (3386) 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
STEPHEN G. STOKER (3122) 
DAVID B. THOMAS (3 218) 
STOKER & THOMAS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
211 South State Street, Suite 440 
Salt Lake Citv, Utan 34111 
Telephone: .801) 359-4000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHY LYNN HIGGINS, individually : 
and as Guardian ad Litem for : 
SHAUNDRA HIGGINS, : 
: AMENDED NOTICE 
Plaintiff, : OF APPEAL 
vs. : 
Civil No. 34-4921 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WILLIAM : 
KUENTZEL, SHERYL STEADMAN, : Judge James S. Sawaya 
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, THE : 
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, 
CAROLINE TURJILLO AND JOHN : 
DOES I througn 10, : 
Defendants. : 
The Plaintiff Kathy Higgms, individually and as guardian 
ad litem for her daughter Shaundra Higgms, pursuant to Rule 
3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, appeals the 
following summary judgments entered by the Honoraole James S. 
Sawaya, Third District Court Judge pursuant to Rule 54(b) , 
U.R.C.P., in the above entitled action: 
1. The April 23, 1990 Judgment and Order finding the 
defendants Salt Lake County, William Kuentzel and Sheryl 
Steadman owed no duty to Plaintiff or her daughter, Shaundra. 
2. The April 23, 1990 Summary Judgment finding the 
defendant University of Utah and University Medical Center owed 
no duty to Plaintiff or her daughter, Shaundra. 
DATED this , , ^  day of May, 1990. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
Rodney G. Snow 
Neil A. Kaplan 
James L. Warlaumont 
STOKER & THOMAS 
Stepnen B. Stoker ^ ^ 
David B. Thomas 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Kathy Lynn 
Higgms, individually ana as guardian 
ad litem for Shaundra Hiqams 
3c S N O W —9 — 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of NOTICE OF APPEAL to be mailed, postage prepaid thereon, 
this M 3- day of Mayf 1990 to the following: 
Patricia J. Marlowe, Esq. 
Assistant Salt Lake County 
Attorney 
2001 South State Street 
Room #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Attorneys for Steadman, 
Kuentzel and Salt Lake County 
Bruce H. Jensen, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
1100 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for University 
Medical Center 
2-
_Y2E. P°ATT 
& SNOW 
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64-7-7. Supervision and treatment of mentally ill person, 
by division. 
TKe DWi.cn of Mental HeaUh * » » » ^ — £ 3 S S £ 
elsewhere. 
64-7-29. Admission of voluntary patient for observation or 
care — Age of patient. 
The superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or director of a mental 
health facility or either of their designees may admit for observation, diagno-
sis, care, and treatment any individual who is mentally ill or has symptoms of 
mental illness and who, being sixteen years of age or over, applies therefor, 
and any individual under sixteen years of age who is mentally ill or has 
symptoms of mental illness, if his parent or legal guardian applies therefor in 
his behalf. 
No person over sixteen years of age may be hospitalized or continue to be 
hospitalized against his will, except as provided in this chapter. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AMEND. XIV, § 5 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote 
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years 
of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or" hold any office, civil or military, under 
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken 
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given 
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt 
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Sec. 11. [Courts open—Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
